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CIVIL RIGHTS AND WEST VIRGINIA:
A Centennial Study
RoBgIT E. MAXWELL 
T O the historian, West Virginia typifies a frontier of
personal independence and freedom, commencing prior to
the Revolutionary War days, and where the State's motto,
"Mountaineers are always free," is a vital, vigorous and
living symbol; and to the scholar, who correlates achieve-
ment with the forces of history, West Virginia represents
a "Federal" philosophy born of the belief that "all men
are, by nature, equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or
divest their posterity, namely: The enjoyment of life and
liberty with the means of acquiring and possessing property,
and of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." 1
On June 20, 1863, West Virginia became the thirty-
fifth State of the Union. The progression of events leading
to and finalizing the separation of the lands now known as
West Virginia from the mother State of Virginia is em-
j In 1961, Mr. Maxwell was appointed United States Attorney for the
Northern District of West Virginia. From 1953 to 1961, he served as
Prosecuting Attorney of Randolph County, West Virginia, resigning during
his last term to assume the duties of his present office.
1W. VA. CoNsT. art. 3, § 1.
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blematic of the heritage of the Mountain State which,
during the year 1963, is being heralded across the length
and breadth of the Nation. West Virginia's Centennial
Year, 1963, following a century of statehood, is an appro-
priate time and occasion to reflect upon the problems cur-
rently present, the events recorded during the century, and
to speculate on the prospects for the future in the basic areas
of civil rights.
West Virginia was born of the basic issue of civil rights
-slavery-and during the succeeding century has continued
in large measure a sovereign philosophy which, during the
mid-1800's, was known as the "northern" viewpoint, with
scattered pockets of "southern" sympathy. It is recorded
that President Abraham Lincoln justified his course in
signing the statehood bill as a war measure, and West
Virginia is sometimes described as "war born."
EVOLUTION INTO STATEHOOD
The political development of West Virginia into state-
hood, both before and during the scarring and searing of
its population and terrain during the Civil War conflict,
is symbolical of its traditional doctrine in the development
of personal equality and liberty, as eloquently portrayed
by Patrick Henry, who said: "No free government or the
blessings of liberty can be preserved to any people but by a
fair adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality,
and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles." On the vote for secession of Virginia by the
people west of the mountains, 40,000 out of a total of
44,000 votes were against it. This sentiment was reflected
in enlistments in the Union and Confederate armies with
about 32,000 ITnion and about 8,000 Confederate recruits.
In the certified original of the constitution presented
to Congress on behalf of the proposed new state, the seventh
section of Article XT read as follows:
7. No slave shall be brought or free person of color be permitted
to come into this state for permanent residence.
Congress was not satisfied with this terminology in the
proposed constitution and required that the seventh section
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of the constitution be changed so as to provide for the
gradual extinguishment of slavery, and this was accomplished
with the adoption by the embryo state of the following
worded section:
The children of slaves born within the limits of this State after
the fourth of July, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, shall be free
and that all slaves within the said State who shall, at the time
aforesaid, be under the age of ten years, shall be free when they
arrive at the age of twenty-one years; and all slaves over ten,
and under tventy-one years, shall be free when they arrive at the
age of tventy-one years; and no slave shall be permitted to
come into the State for permanent residence therein.
President Lincoln, after studying the West Virginia
statehood bill during the maximum time permitted under
the Constitution and having referred it to his Cabinet
which stood equally divided, signed the bill. "Admission
was under an act signed by the President on December 31,
1862, and was conditioned upon acceptance of the so-called
Willey Amendment which provided for the gradual abolition
of :Negro slavery."' 2  On April 20, 1863, President Lincoln
executed the proclamation, effective sixty days from date,
declaring the State of West Virginia to be one of the
United States of America.3
Slavery was an important factor in the Civil War but
it was not the primary cause of the conflict, which was
the right of a state to leave the Union. Slavery, however,
was one of the subjects in dispute between the eastern
landholders of Virginia and the people west of the mountains
that finally led to division of Virginia into two states.
The institution of slavery developed in Eastern Virginia
due to cultivation of tobacco, and Negro slaves were valuable
as field hands. However, there was not the same need
2 5 DICTIONARY OF AuERICAN HISTORY, West Virginia: Constitutional
Aspects of its Fomnation 439 (1942).
3 "WHERF-AS, by the act of Congress approved the 31st day of December
last (1861) the State of West Virginia was declared to be one of the
United States of America. . . . I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States, do hereby, in pursuance of the act of Congress aforesaid,
declare and proclaim that the said act shall take effect and be in force
from and after sixty days from the date hereof. . ."
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for slaves in Western Virginia where plantations were
scarce and where the land was unsuitable for extensive
cultivation of tobacco. In 1850 the total population of
West Virginia was 302,313 but only 21,736 of that number
were slaves. Most of the Negroes were owned by planters
in the eastern area or by large landowners in the central
area. A major reason for that was the type of people
who lived in the mountains of West Virginia. They were
accustomed to doing their own work. They were engaged
in occupations where slaves would have been of little or no
value.
Those who owned slaves in West Virginia treated them
as chore-boys and domestic help. They were not over-
worked, had regular hours, and were given rewards for good
behavior and for good work. The master felt an obligation
to feed the slaves well and to furnish them with proper
medical attention, clothes, and shelter. Women slaves in
West Virginia were not compelled to do field work. They
were engaged for the most part in spinning, cooking, and
caring for the children. Slaves were permitted to marry,
not legally, but by consent of their masters. In most
instances the men and women felt they were joined for life
and were happy.
West Virginia was near the free territory of Ohio and
Pennsylvania. That had something to do with the way
slaves were treated in this State. While there was a
Virginia fugitive slave law intended to have runaway slaves
returned to their owners, it was difficult to enforce where
public sentiment was opposed to slavery. There were many
white people in the State who were conscientiously opposed
to slavery. They felt morally obligated to assist any slaves
who wanted their freedom. As a result, there were many
depots in West Virginia on the "underground railway."
By that system slaves were sent from one station to another
and given food and clothing on their trip to Canada where
they were free.
The question of slavery was one of the important points
in the admission of West Virginia as a separate state.
Charles Sumner, in July 1862, refused to vote for admission
of West Virginia with a constitution that recognized slavery.
[ VOL. 37
1963 ] CIVIL RIGHTS AND WEST VIRGINIA 205
The constitution contained a provision that children born
of slave mothers after July 4, 1863, would be free. That
was a compromise to take care of the slave owners. But
Sumner held that any slaves were too many.
The subject of slavery was hotly debated at the Wheeling
Convention, which wrote the new State's constitution.
Gordon Battelle, an outstanding statesman, worked hard for
a constitutional provision that would-abolish slavery gradu-
ally. That was defeated. Then he sought to submit the
question to a vote of the people. That also was rejected
but by a 24-23 vote. A provision was finally adopted
prohibiting any slave or free person of color from coming
into the State for permanent residence after adoption of the
constitution. One suggestion was made to the convention
for a provision authorizing slave owners to recover from
the State "the actual value of such slaves at the time of
emancipation." Another suggestion proposed that Congress
issue bonds for $2,000,000 with which to pay slaveholders in
West Virginia. All of the suggestions and recommendations
were voted down.
Then a resolution was passed unanimously on February
17th to insert the congressional requirement into the con-
stitution. The requirement, as an amendment to the
constitution, was submitted to a vote by the people of the
State on March 26, 1863. It was ratified 18,862 to 514.
As West Virginia has evolved and grown from an
embryo State of the Union, so has the State grown in com-
merce, industry and public affairs of the Union. As civil
rights, considered in its broadest context, has developed,
so also has the Mountain State developed. The growth
of West Virginia, paralleling the development of personal
liberties and freedom, has often been slow, hesitant, faltering,
and in many instances disheartening, but always in an
affirmative and positive manner.
An example of West Virginia's development is the
area of natural resources. At the turn of the century of
West Virginia's history, the Mountain State is approximately
two-thirds timbered with some of the finest hardwood
products of the United States. Demand for West Virginia's
cherry, maple, oak and other species of hardwood comes
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from practically every state of the Union as well as from
many foreign nations. Used particularly in the furniture
industry, West Virginia's forest products-a magnificent,
recurring natural resource-are also used for many other
purposes where a high-quality wood product is demanded.
The supply of timber for the world's use is a long-time
natural resource of the Mountain State. New timber stand
practices have guaranteed future generations of an in-
creasingly better quality of timber, thus opening the potential
for new industrial use of this raw material.
The thirty-fifth State's coal deposits have long made
it he virtual coal capitol of the United States. Recent
adverse conditions involving unemployment, loss of popula-
tion and other matters do not minimize the fact that West
Virginia's coal deposits have made and are making millions
of dollars available to the Union's commerce. Reflecting
on coal history, the barons of early development were suc-
cessful in escaping the pangs of taxation on coal exports
from West Virginia. With the exceptions of wages-often
meager- and royalties to landowners- also meager- the
fruits of coal production, reaching into the billions of tons,
fell into the hands of out-of-state commercial and industrial
interests. The future of coal in the Mountain State is still
one of the bright stars of her economy. Automation and
techniques of production have made additional billions of
tons of coal available for future generations.
The rugged mountains of West Virginia are not only an
attraction for tourist investment dollars-the State being
within 500 miles of approximately twenty-one percent of the
Nation's population-but also are a haven for fortunes to
be made in mining, timber, oil and gas, as well as other
areas of endeavor from natural resources.
Having been a state that relied on rail transportation
as its chief means of exporting its natural resources, West
Virginia, in the transition period during the decline of the
rail industry, has found itself without adequate transporta-
tion of its products. That problem is now being cured with
the advent of express highway plans and projects through
the mountains, linking West Virginia with its neighbor
states on every side. Interstate 79-running north and
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south-the Allegheny Park Way-running east and west-
the Scenic Highway-running generally southeast to north-
west-are the recognition of the need in transportation
necessary to redevelop Wrest Virginia's commercial and
industrial complex. A new generation of industrialists and
businessmen, on the move to new fields of accomplishment,
are turning their attention steadily toward the Mountain
State and realizing that the domains of the past, the giants
of yesterday's industry in West Virginia, are mythical bar-
riers to new fortunes that are present and awaiting new
ideas, new plans and a fresh outlook for the future.
West Virginia's birth from the basic civil rights
struggle, its growth and development, the sacrifices of its
people-caught, so to speak, between two fires-the over-
powering faith and conviction of the forefathers of the
State, the resulting respect for individual dignity, enterprise
and freedom of thought, expression and movement, serve
as a remarkable plateau of accomplishment in the field of
past, as well as future, civil rights of the nation and the
world. The risk, the gamble, the strength of character,
the willingness to forsake every personal treasure, even life
itself, exhibited by the West Virginians of the mid-1800's
are an example of the courage and purpose then held and
now so vitally needed to meet the problems of a world
today-half free, half slave.
THE MnANiNG OF CIVIL RIGHTS
It is considered appropriate on this occasion-the
very beginning of a new century in this basic struggle
of a Christian Democracy-that the Nation, as well as
the world, take a solid look at true civil rights as they
now exist, in light of our knowledge of history, and ponder
with the deepest concern exactly where our future lies.
If we are to give only lip service to true civil rights in
the future, refuse to be an active part of the growth of
true civil rights and the attached individual dignity of
mankind, or fail to assume the responsibilities of individual
achievement in the true picture of personal attainment, then
we indict, summarily convict-with constitutional guar-
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antees-and sentence ourselves and the generations that
follow us to the bondage and slavery from which our an-
cestors struggled and arose with devastating suffering of
both body and spirit. In a real and certain sense, we
will shatter the vision of a democratic way of life-we will
murder-as certainly as with a knife-the highest and most
advanced state of civilization ever achieved by mortal man
in all history and in all ages.
It will be sufficient purpose of this undertaking if it
will provide a vehicle of thought for concerned minds to
unemotionally, soberly, rationally, logically and clearly eval-
uate true civil rights, afford them the proper perspective,
and lead the way for the continuation of our heritage--
which is also the heritage, achieved or unachieved, of every
human in the world.
On this occasion of the Centennial of West Virginia's
creation, it is an objective viewpoint that the term "civil
rights" is grossly misunderstood in that too often the term
is limited and confined to some narrow, explosive and
emotion-laden incident, consistent only with the contempor-
aneous news reporting of an event-usually of ugly pro-
portions. While it is true that these are all elements of
civil rights and its development, and are all concerned
with basic principles of a vigorous Christian Democracy,
they are not ends of themselves.
A civil right may be defined as one which appertains to a person
by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community, a right
accorded to every member of a distinct community or nation,
or a right which the municipal law will enforce at the instance
of a private individual for the purpose of securing to him the
enjoyment of his means of happiness.
Civil rights include the rights of property, marriage, protection
by the laws, freedom of contracts and trial by jury, to name
but a few. As sometimes stated, civil rights consist of the
power of acquiring and enjoying property, of exercising the
paternal and marital powers, and the like. In its broadest sense
the term "civil rights" includes those rights which are the out-
growth of civilization, the existence and exercise of which neces-
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sarily follow from the rights that repose in the subjects of a
country exercising self-government.
4
Civil Rights is a term applied to certain rights secured to
citizens by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution, or by various acts, state and federal. 5
The [current] Solicitor General of the United States, Archibald
Cox, is fond of quoting an ancient saying of Bracton--"not under
man but under God and law." This surely expresses one of the
essential elements of our society and of western civilization. The
decisions of the Supreme Court and the orders of the lower
federal courts in the civil rights field have caused great emotion
and great bitterness. But this is a necessary result of the
achievement of revolutionary social and economic change through
legal growth. Law exists to serve the needs of men, and when
the needs of men are revolutionary in nature-as has -been true
of the needs of Negroes in the United States in the past-the
courts and the processes of the law are blamed for doing what
must be done. Yet the alternative is either chaos or rigid control
through dictatorship without regard to the law. So it is best
that the contemporary conflicts in society are reflected in tensions
in the law, and are resolved through decisions under the law.
The conflict in society which cuts the deepest today in this
country is between the ideals of liberty and equality of the
Declaration of Independence-that all men are created free and
are equal before the law-and the deep-rooted attitudes and social
customs, North as well as South, which antedate the Declaration.
The conflict itself is so clear and so personal in the daily lives
of so many people-both those struggling for the achievement
of full civil rights and those resisting change-that the legal issues
to the public must seem equally clear and subject to easy resolution.
Yet the fact is that there is an increasing danger of oversimplifying
the task of the lawyers and the courts, and of failing to take
into account conflicting principles which are at stake.6
Further considering the popular restriction of the term
and principle of civil rights, as that concept appears in
414 C.J.S. Civil Rights §1, at 1159 (1939).
5 BLACK, LAw DIcrioNAY (3d ed. 1933).6 Excerpts from Address by Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall,
NAACP Annual Convention, July 2, 1962.
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the vernacular, we must constantly pause to remember that
in the broad field of civil rights the same are not exclusively
limited to the abolition of slavery and other obvious con-
cepts, but are equally applicable to the freedom and in-
dependence, both of thought and action, of every citizen of
the United States, regardless of his ancestry, race or creed.
In its broadest perspective, "civil rights" refers to those
rights and privileges which are guaranteed by law to each
person, regardless of race, religion, color, ancestry, national
origin, or place of birth: the right to work, to education, to
housing, to the use of public accommodations, health and
welfare services and facilities, and the right to live in peace
and dignity, without discrimination or segregation. They
are the rights which Government has the duty to defend
and expand.'
Civil rights in its proper perspective is as broad as
each individual daily problem of each American citizen.
Anti-discrimination laws are inevitable to protect employment
rights.' Strides forward have been made with the develop-
ment of federal law to terminate racial and religious
discrimination in employment, and particular activity has
been noted in this field by programs of the National Labor
Relations Board.9 In the field of personal endeavor and
achievement there have been advances, but still wide gaps
exist caused by discriminating practices.'0 Discrimination
and impoverishment are more than coincidents, and are
often found among non-whites." Equal rights and job
discrimination are also found in the field involving the
employment of men as well as women. By no means does
civil rights limit itself to color and sex, inasmuch as dis-
crimination during the advent of automation has become
7 LESKES, THE CIvILI RIGHTS STORY 3 (1961).
8 Kovarsky, Racial Discrimination in Employment and the Federal Law,
38 ORE. L. REV. 54 (1958).
9Note, Racial and Religious Discrimination in Employment amd the
Role of the NLRB, 20 MD. L. REV. 219-32 (1961).
1o Pressler & Fundler, Discrimination in Union, Membership: Denial of
Due Process under Federal Collective Bargaining Legislation, 12 RuTGERs
L. REv. 543-56 (1958).
' Slaiman, Discrimination and Low Incomes, AEmucAN FDERATIONIST
17-19 (1961).
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particularly prevalent with the relieving of job opportunities
because of age discriminations. 2
In the popular mind we too often associate civil rights
with the quest of the colored race to achihve equality under
the law. While this phase of civil rights is entirely proper
and is most assuredly a vital, living necessity in the develop-
ment of freedom, liberty and equality in this Nation, it
is not limited to any one particular race or creed, but is
completely applicable to each citizen, each with his own
problem, and whether that citizen be Irish, Polish, or
some other nationality, and whether that citizen was born
on the right or the wrong side of the tracks, and regardless
of whether that citizen, through no fault of his own, but
by predetermination of the Divine Creator is associated
by background, environment, or by his own choice, with
a creed or belief to which bigotry, suspicion, fear, mis-
understanding or hatred by his fellow man may attach.
While not an end in itself, the struggle of the Negro
for civil rights is graphic of the civil rights problem at
hand and the attainment of which is, or should be, the
goal of every citizen of a democratic government. The de-
velopment of the Negro's civil rights from the Emancipation
Proclamation to the integration of the University of Mis-
sissippi in 1962, by the enrollment of James Meredith as a
student in that formerly all white institution of higher
learning, is the dramatic fight for civil liberty.
Three months and two days following the birth of the
State of West Virginia, President Abraham Lincoln arose
at a Cabinet meeting and read from a manuscript before
him: "all persons held as slaves within any state, or
designated part of a state, the people thereof shall then
be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then,
thence forward and forever free. . . ." Thus the drama
began to prevent our Nation from being "half slave and
half free." The struggle continues in the classrooms in
all sections of our Nation, in the legislative chambers
12 Note. Age Discrimination in Employment: Legislative Collective Bar-
gaining Solutions, 53 Nw. U.L. Rmv'. 96-108 (1958); Note, Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment: An FEPC Misfit, 61 YALE L... 574 (1952).
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of the lawmaking bodies, aboard the transportation facilities
of our Nation, in the voting registrars' offices of our Nation,
and in the chambers of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
THE ROLE; OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The story involving the development of freedom for
all Americans began as President Lincoln first read the
Emancipation Proclamation to his Cabinet on September
22, 1862, shortly after an opportune victory at Antietam.
Of the many milestones recorded during the past century
in the development of civil rights, particularly as pertains
to the rise of the Negro from slavery to equality, historians
generally agree that the two principal achievements are:
First: The war amendments to the Constitution, par-
ticularly the fourteenth, ratified in 1868, which defined
citizenship and extended the equal protection of law to
all persons. The thirteenth amendment gave force to the
Emancipation Proclamation by truly freeing the slaves.
The fifteenth amendment established voting rights for the
Negro, thus placing the franchise of freedom in the hands
of all persons.
Second: Brown v. Board of Educ., 3 the United States
Supreme -Court decision of May 17, 1954, which reversed
the long-standing rule of "separate but equal" schools.
Historians universally agree that the 1954 decision set a
new standard of opportunity.
Other milestones considered by many to be exceedingly
important include the Supreme Court decision of 1944,
Smith v. A1lwright,"4 which opened previously all white
primary elections to Negroes; Executive Order No. 8802,
issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, barring
discrimination in factories with defense contracts; and the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, later declared unconstitutional,
but which dared to call for the protection of the rights
of Negroes as any other American citizens.
3347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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To review the broad concept of a subject such as civil
rights adequately, it is a regrettable requirement that resort
to generalities interspersed with specifics is requisite. Civil
rights were the very roots of the formation of our Nation,
as well as the birth of West Virginia.
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, conceived at
a time when many Americans feared above all a strong and
possibly tyrannical central government, contain no reference
to federal protection of civil rights. Each state, with its
own constitution and usually its own bill of rights, exer-
cised sole jurisdiction over the civil status of its inhabitants.
In 1833, Chief Justice Marshall declared specifically that
the first ten amendments, constituting the Federal Bill of
Rights, were not binding on the various states in the
decision of Barron v. Baltimore.5 From the framing of
the Constitution to the Civil War, the realm of civil rights
was thus left wholly to the states. After the Civil War,
however, a legislative program for the federal guarantee of
racial equality took form. Developed in terms of Northern
ideals and politics and modified by Southern ideals and
politics, this program has been thwarted as well as supported
by the Supreme Court.
The first move in the program was the adoption by
Congress and the states of the thirteenth amendment,
December 18, 1865, abolishing slavery and involuntary
servitude, and giving Congress the power to enforce the
amendment by appropriate legislation. But, in view of
the tremendous problem involved in setting up immediately
a free labor system in the war-torn South, and also in view
of the famous Dred Scott"6 decision of 1857 which declared
in effect that even free Negroes were not necessarily full
citizens, the Southern states passed a series of "Black
Codes." These codes usually required Negroes to work
for a white master, to carry a permit in crossing county
boundaries, and to undergo apprenticeships. Such offenses
as vagrancy were severely punished. To combat this Southern
1532 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250 (1833).
1660 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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move, the Congress passed in 1866 the first Civil Rights
Act.
The Civil Rights or Enforcement Act of April 9, 1866,"
affirmed that all persons born in the United States were
citizens, and it endeavored to put members of all races
on equal footing regarding their rights to sue, to make
and enforce contracts, to lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property. It further secured to all persons
the right to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property. Severe
penalties were prescribed for violations, and the President
was given the power to use land and naval forces for the
purpose of enforcement.' 8
Of two other statutes passed at approximately the same
time, one made it a federal crime to kidnap or carry away
a person with intent to place him in slavery (Slave Kid-
napping Act, May 22, 1866), 19 and the other defined "in-
voluntary servitude" (Peonage Abolition Act of March 2,
1867) .20
Since the constitutionality of the first Civil Rights Act
was sharply contested, Congress prepared the fourteenth
amendment and submitted it to the states two months later.
The first section of the amendment provided:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States,
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within. its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The Southern states initially refused to ratify this amend-
ment. On July 28, 1868, the amendment was finally ratified,
1714 Stat. 27 (1866), entitled "An Act to protect all persons in the
United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the means of their
vindication."
18 CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SwoRD
37-38 (1947).
1914 Stat. 50 (1866).
2014 Stat. 546 (1867).
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but Reconstruction continued. The Southern resistance
to this took the form of renewed opposition to Negro suf-
frage through Ku Klux Klan activities.
The North then moved to protect suffrage rights very
specifically through the fifteenth amendment, ratified March
30, 1870, which provided:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Congress was given the power to enforce the article by
appropriate legislation. Congress also attempted to check
the Klan by several other general Civil Rights Acts.
The Civil Rights or Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870,
amended by an Act of February 28, 1871,21 protected the
right to vote by providing federal machinery to supervise
state elections and prescribing severe penalties for inter-
ference with voting in state and federal elections which
stemmed from race or color discrimination. It became a
felony for two or more persons to conspire to interfere
with the free exercise by any citizen of any right granted
him by the -Constitution or the laws of the United States.
The Ku Klux Klan or Anti-Lynching Act of April 20,
1871,22 penalized action which, under color of law, deprived
persons of their civil rights. It also provided penalties for
conspiracy to overthrow the government or to prevent the
execution of its laws, and authorized the President to use
military force in the suppression of unlawful action when
the states were unable or unwilling to halt either inter-
ference with civil rights or with the government's processes
to secure them.
The last legislation was passed in 1875, after some
Southern states had begun to pass segregation statutes.
21 16 Stat. 140 (1870), as amended, 16 Stat. 433 (1871), entitled "An
Act to enforce the Rights of Citizens of the United States to vote in the
several states of this Union and for other Purposes."
22 17 Stat. 13 (1871), entitled "An Act to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and for
other Purposes."
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The Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875,23 guaranteed
to Negroes equal accommodations with whites in all inns,
public conveyances, theaters, and other places of amusement.
Refusal by private persons was made a misdemeanor and
injured parties were given the right to sue for damages
in court.
These general Civil Rights Acts leave little doubt that
these measures sought to give the federal government power
to protect individuals from discrimination by the states
or by other individuals. The supporters of this legislation
apparently expected to retain power themselves by dis-
enfranchising white Southerners and by winning the freed-
men permanently to the Republican Party.24
Constitutionally speaking, these measures meant drastic
changes, materially altering the balance of state and federal
power. The Supreme Court, in interpreting the acts, was
most influenced by the traditional federal-state balance.
It therefore construed them as narrowly as possible or
rejected them as unconstitutional. In 1872, in The Slaughter-
house Cases,25 the Supreme Court limited the fourteenth
amendment by pointing out that there were two kinds
of citizenship-state and federal-and that the fourteenth
amendment referred only to the privileges and immunities
of United States citizens. The Court therefore refused to
"bring within the power of -Congress the entire domain of
civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States."
The next important decision was in The Civil Rights
Cases26 in which the Court held that the 1875 Civil Rights
Act was largely unconstitutional because the Court con-
strued the fourteenth amendment as prohibiting only state,
not individual, action. The Court gradually elaborated this
distinction, deciding that the conspiracy section of the first
Civil Rights Act could not be used to protect citizens from
individual, non-official interference with the following rights:
23 18 Stat. 335 (1875), entitled "An Act to protect all citizens in their
civil and legal rights."
24 1 MORISON & COMMAGER, GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 45
(1950).
2583 U.S. 36 (1872).
26109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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the right of peaceable assembly," the right not to be
lynched," the right to organize unions,2 9 or the right to
remain within a state."0  Nor did the rights protected
under the due process clause include the right to vote in
state elections,3 or the right- to run for state office. In
short, as former Attorney General Francis Biddle has
pointed out:
The application of criminal sanctions to the protection of civil
rights has come to be restricted mainly to cases in which State
officials participate, or misuse their power, or to situations involving
rights granted directly to individuals and guaranteed against
individual infringement by the Federal Constitution or laws. For
many years such rights were few in number, limited for the
most part to those granted by the Thirteenth Amendment, and
to rights under such laws as homestead acts and other federal
land laws.33
Beginning in 1873, Congress also weakened the force
of civil rights legislation by issuing the Revised Statutes
of 1873 which divided the civil and the criminal procedures
for protection of civil rights. In 1877, Congress attempted
to repeal many of these remaining provisions of previous
civil rights legislation but President Hayes vetoed the
effort. In 1894, however, thirty-nine sections of the Revised
Statutes dealing with federal protection of the right to
vote were repealed under President Grover Cleveland.3
In 1909 another codification, in the preparation of the
Criminal Code, reduced still further the original legislation. 5
Moreover, the word willfulky was inserted without explan-
27 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S..542 (1875).
28United States v. Powell, 151 Fed. 648 (N.D. Ala. 1907), aff'd, 212
U.S. 564 (1908).29 United States v. Moore, 129 Fed. 630 (N.D. Ala. 1904).
3oUnted States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
31 Green v. Mills, 69 Fed. 852 (4th Cir. 1895).32 Taylor v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
33 Biddle, Civil Rights and the Federal Law in Safeguarding Civil Liberty
Today, in THE EDWARD L. BER1xAYs LwruRas OF 1944 131. This lecture
provides a brief and objective survey of federal civil rights legislation.
3428 Stat. 36 (1894).
3535 Stat. 1088 (1909).
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ation, making one provision read "whoever under color of
law . . . willfully subjects .... )y 36
For the past thirty years, there have been efforts by
some Congressmen to enact more federal laws to protect
civil rights. The proposals have included anti-lynching
bills, anti-poll tax bills, and peacetime Fair Employment
Practices legislation. In 1948, even after the impetus
provided by the report, To Secure These Rights, from
President Truman's -Commission on Civil Rights, and even
after the President personally requested a comprehensive
program including anti-lynch, anti-poll tax, anti-segregation,
and FEPC legislation, no important legislative action was
taken.
The development of civil rights, insofar as criminal
sanctions and statutes are concerned, has been grounded on
Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 241 " and 242. Section 241
is aimed at a criminal conspiracy to injure, oppress, or
intimidate citizens (not aliens) in the exercise of federally
secured rights and privileges. These rights are not enum-
erated in either section 241 or 242. They are to be found
in various statutes and in certain portions of the Con-
stitution, notably in the first eight amendments and in the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The rights protected
by section 241 are comparatively few in number.
The chief utility of section .241 for the enforcement
of statutory rights has been as a criminal penalty for other-
wise helpless statutes. The Homestead Laws, which provide
machinery for obtaining title to land in the public domain
on compliance with certain conditions, do not contain
specific criminal provisions penalizing interference with the
36 Criminal Code of 1909, § 20, 35 Stat. 1092. See also 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1958).
37 Section 241 reads as follows: "If two or more persons conspire to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the
same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises
of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoy-
ment of any right or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both."
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right which the statutes grant. However, the Supreme
Court has held that running a homesteader off his land,
being a deprivation of the right acquired under the statute,
is punishable under section 241, provided a conspiracy is
involved."8 This theory appears applicable to any case
of intimidation of a person who has personal rights under
federal law. Under the Social Security laws, the Fair
Labor Standards Act and other statutes, benefits are con-
ferred on persons or protection is afforded them against
lawless interference.
The Constitution deals primarily with relationships
between the federal and state governments and between
these governments and private persons. Therefore, abuse
by one private individual of another gives rise to a
deprivation of a constitutional right in comparatively few
instances. Hence, section 241 has only limited application
to the conduct of private persons. In the absence of special
facts, the ordinary outbreak of mob violence or vigilante
activity directed against minorities, soap box orators, re-
ligious groups or others is not within the section. Such
aggressions may appear to constitute deprivations of the
rights to liberty or life, freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom from unlawful
searches and seizures, or other invasions of personal rights
mentioned in the Constitution. But these rights are rights
against official action only and do not extend to the private
behavior of one individual towards another. This situation
is perhaps best summed up by Cushman, in his book
entitled Safeguarding Our Civil Liberties.9
In United States v. Mosley4" decided in 1915, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said,
"The source of this section (241) in the doings of the
38United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
39 CUSHMAN, SAFEGUARDING OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES 45 (1943): "Broadly
speaking it is the State and not the Federal government which can prevent
this kind of abuse [private deprivation of civil liberties]. No Pidividual can
possibly violate the federal Bill of Rights which begins wifh the words:
'Congress shall make no law . . ! and has been held to restrict only the
Federal government. Nor can an individual violate the 14th Amendment
which clearly says 'no state . . .' shall do the things forbidden."
40238 U.S. 383 (1915).
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Ku Klux and the like is obvious and acts of violence
obviously were in the minds of Congress. . . . But this
section dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal
rights, and protected them in the lump .... ,41 Until
the decision in Williams v. United States" in 1951, it
was thought that the rights "protected in the lump" in-
cluded not only the comparatively few secured against
private invasion but also those which the Constitution
(principally the first eight and the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments) secures against deprivation by state or federal
officers acting in their official capacities. However, in
the Williams case, the Supreme Court divided 4-4 on the
question as to whether this section could reach a conspiracy
of officials acting under "color of law." Four members of
the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held
that the application of section 241 is limited to those
rights which Congress can secure against invasion by
private persons. In this opinion the applicability of the
section has been apparently narrowed to such few situations
as involve deprivations by private persons, such as the right
to vote in federal elections,43 the right of a voter in a
federal election to have his ballot fairly counted,44 the right
to be free from mob violence while in federal custody,45
the right to assemble and discuss federal problems,4  the
right to testify in the federal courts,47 the right to inform
a federal officer of a violation of federal law,4" the right
to furnish military supplies to the federal government for
defense purposes,49 the right to enforce a decree of a federal
court by contempt proceedings, 0 the right, as a federal
41 Id. at 387.
42341 U.S. 70 (1951).
43ES parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
44United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).45 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).46 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Powe v.
United States, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 679 (1940).
47 Foss v. United States, 266 Fed. 881 (9th Cir. 1920).
481n re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Nicholson v. United States, 79
F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1935); Hawkins v. State, 293 Fed. 586 (5th Cir. 1923).
49Anderson v. United States, 269 Fed. 65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 255
U.S. 576 (1920).
5o United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885 (C.C.W.D. Ga. 1890).
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officer, not to be interfered with in the performance of
his duties,51 and the right to be free to perform a duty
imposed by the federal constitution.52
Section 242 is aimed at infringement of federally-
secured rights by the wrongful action of state or federal
government officials. 3 At the outset, it will be observed
that two distinct offenses are defined by this section:
(1) The wilful subjection of any inhabitant, under color
of law, to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the United States Constitution and laws; and
(2) The wilful subjection of any inhabitant, under color
of law, to discriminatory pains or punishments on account
of race, color, or alienage.5 4 Unlike section 241, section 242
is not a conspiracy statute and may be violated by a
single individual. Further, the protection of section 242
is not limited to citizens and. so far as the first offense
referred to above, the section's protection extends to all
inhabitants of any state, territory, or district, regardless
of race or class identification.
To be in violation of, section 242, the act resulting in
deprivation of federally-secured rights must be done "wil-
fully." In defining the word "wilfully," the Supreme Court
has stated in Screws v. United States " that it is not
enough that the wrongdoer have a general bad purpose
or an evil intent to do wrong. He must have at the
time he commits the offense a specific intent to deprive
the victim of a federal right which has been made specific
either by "the express terms of the Constitution or laws
of the United States or the decisions interpreting them."
M McDonald v. United States, 9 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1925); United States
v. Patrick, 54 Fed. 338 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1893).52 Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).53 Section 242 reads as follows: "Whoever, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant
of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on
account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or
race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not
more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."5 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327 (1941).
55325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945).
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The act forbidden can be violated in the first instance
only by persons occupying public office-federal, state, or
municipal-or persons who exercise governmental powers.
The gist of the offense defined by section 242 in each
case is the deprivation of a right secured by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States. Among the more
important of the rights secured are those defined in the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, i.e., the right not to be
deprived by either a state or the federal government of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and
the right not to be deprived at the hands of a state of the
equal protection of the laws.
The majority of prosecutions under this section* have
been concerned with the deprivation of liberty. Liberty includes
personal security " as well as freedom from physical re-
straint. It also includes freedom of speech and the press, 7
freedom to assemble peaceably,5" to petition the government, 9
to pursue a lawful calling, 0 to express and exercise religious
beliefs,61 to establish a home,12 and to be secure therein
from unlawful searches and seizures.63 The right to due
process in this connection includes the right to a fair trial,
which means a real, not a sham or pretended, hearing,"
the right not to be tried by ordeal or summarily punished
other than in the manner prescribed by law,65 the right
to be free from prison brutality-a right possessed even
by convicts in state prisons,6 6 the right not to be compelled
56 Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 831 (1951).
57 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).5 8Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. I.6 0 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
61 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).62 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
63 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6 4 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
65 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
66 United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956); United States
v. Walker, 216 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959 (1955);
United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953).
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to confess to an offense, 7 the right of a defendant in
criminal cases to be represented by counsel,6" and the right
to a jury from which members of the defendant's race have
not been purposely excluded. 9
The foregoing rights are secured against federal, state
and local officials alike and any intentional interference
with them by public officials may be punished under section
242. It must be kept in mind, however, that section 242
may also be utilized to punish official interference with
rights secured against infringement by private individuals.
For example, the section is applicable to an official who
deprives a person of the right not to be held as a slave,
or the right to vote at a federal election, or the right of
access to federal courts,"' or the right to inform federal
officers concerning federal offenses,71 or the right to be a
witness in the federal courts.
In addition to the rights enumerated above, the first
eight amendments include certain rights secured only as
against infringement by the federal government. An example
of this is the right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. Section 242 also reaches a state official who
wilfully acts so as to deprive a person of the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Official separation of races on a public transportation
system denies equal protection of the laws. 2 In Lynch v.
United States,7" it was held that the phrase "equal pro-
tection of the laws" includes the right of a prisoner to
protection from the officer having him in charge and also
a right to be protected by such officer against injuries by
third persons. In other words, if an officer wilfully turns
a prisoner over to a mob or wilfully permits a mob to
take a prisoner from his custody, he is guilty of violating
67Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
68 Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U.S.L. Week 4291 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1963).69 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
7o Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 583 (1941).71 1n re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).72 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 352 U.S.
903 (1956).
73189 F2d 476, 479 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951).
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section 242. Thus, the Lynch case supports the proposition
that wilful official action and wilful inaction, resulting
in the denial of equal protection, may be penalized under
the section. There seems to be no doubt but that the
theory of this case would apply in other instances.
Since 1884, it has been clear that the provisions of
section 241 secure and protect the right granted by article I,
section 2, of the Constitution to vote in federal elections.7'
In 1915, the Mosley 7 decision extended the protection
of the section to the right to have one's vote honestly
counted. In 1941 the Court, in United States v. Classic,
76
included within the constitutional guarantee the right to
vote and to have the vote honestly counted in a primary
election involving candidates for federal office, where such
primary is an integral part of the election machinery or
success therein is equivalent to election. Also, said the
Court, the right to participate in such a primary is a right
secured by both section 241 and section 242.
A most important and far-reaching result of the Classic
decision is that it led to a re-examination by the Supreme
Court of the "white primary" system which, for a long time,
had allegedly been used in the Southern states as a device
to deprive Negroes of an effective voice in the electoral
process. Prior to Classic, the Court, in Grovey v. Town-
send,7 7 had held that the exclusion of a Negro voter from
a party primary, pursuant to political party regulations,
deprived him of no right guaranteed by the fourteenth or
fifteenth amendments. After the Classic decision, the Su-
preme Court recognized that primary and general elections
had been fused into a single instrumentality. The Court,
therefore, overruled Grovey v. Townsend by its decision in
Smith v. Allwright,7s and held that racial discrimination
by a political party adopted, enforced, or permitted by
a state is state action forbidden by the fourteenth and
74Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
75United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
76313 U.S. 299 (1941).
77295 U.S. 45 (1935).
78321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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fifteenth amendments. This decision opened the way for
Negroes to vote in primary elections.
The courts have resisted any and all attempts to evade
the plain implications of the A11wright decision. Fol-
lowing that decision, the State of South Carolina repealed
all of its primary laws and thus attempted to leave the
matter of holding primaries and the qualifications to vote
therein entirely to the discretion of political parties or
groups. But the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a primary under such auspices is, nevertheless,
one of a two-step election process and that, consequently,
the exclusion of Negroes from such primary because of
party rules is state action and constitutionally forbidden.7 9
President Franklin D. Roosevelt may be said to have
inaugurated much of the present interest and active executive
policies toward racial equality. He strongly upheld the
right of every citizen to vote and to enjoy civil equality
regardless of race or religion. In 1939 he established a
Civil Rights Section in the Department of Justice, which
has been active in many of the criminal civil rights prose-
cutions since that time. President Harry S. Truman gave
added impetus to the move for federal protection of civil
rights by his own strong advocacy of that position. His
was the first administration to seek full federal entry
into the civil rights field with a comprehensive legislative
program.
Executive actions have been most effective within the
executive branch itself. In 1941 President Roosevelt estab-
lished a Committee on Fair Employment Practices to
promote the fullest utilization of all available manpower
and to eliminate discrimination in federal employment.
Executive Order 8802 (1941), reinforced by Executive Order
9346 (1943), prohibited discrimination by any company
holding defense contracts. Tn July 1948, President Truman
set up a Fair Employment Practices Board in the Civil
Service Commission to review complaints of discrimination.
79 Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165
F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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President Eisenhower evidenced a similar desire for
equality in federal employment. In January 1955, the
President's Committee on Government Employment Policy
was set up to study and reinforce this aim." Thus, both
within the federal government and in private work on
government contracts, the executive branch has acted to
eliminate discrimination.
The integration of the Negro into the armed services
represents another executive policy to end discrimination.
Throughout the Second World War, limited integration
policies were adopted by the services separately, as ex-
emplified in particular by unified officer candidate schools.
The Supreme Court made a dramatic entrance into the
area of civil rights with the Brown v. Board of Educ.8
decision of May 17, 1954. The Brown decision overruled
Plessy v. Ferguson 2 and stated that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate education facilities are inherently unequal." With
this decision, which affected the segregated school systems
of seventeen states, the Supreme Court moved to the center
of the civil rights controversy. Although accepted in the
North as long overdue and perhaps in the border states as
inevitable, this decision has been resisted in the deep South
with increasing fervor as a move to destroy states' rights
and the Southern way of life. Moreover, in a series of
other decisions, the Court has come to insist that separate
treatment based on race cannot constitutionally be enforced
by any state agency. The more important cases dealing
with equal protection of the laws and civil rights in recent
years are smmmarized below.
A. Voting rights.
1941: United States v. Classic"8 overruled Newberry
v. United States,84 the Court declaring for the first time
8OExec. Order No. 10590 (1955).
81347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82163 U.S. 537 (1896).
88313 U.S. 299 (1941).
84256 U.S. 232 (1921).
[ VoL. 37
1963 ] CIVIL RIGHTS AND WEST VIRGINIA 227
that Congress had the power to provide for federal regu-
lation of state primaries in which candidates for Congress
are nominated.
1944: In Smith v. Allwright85 the Supreme Court
decided that the "White Primary" was unconstitutional
and that the fifteenth amendment included the right to
become a member of a political party and vote in its
primary elections.
Another decision, United States v. Saylor,"8 indicated
that the stuffing of ballot boxes in favor of one candidate
amounted in effect to a conspiracy, depriving citizens who
voted for another candidate of the federal right to have their
ballots "counted, certified, recorded, and given full value and
effect."
1960: In United States v. Thomas,8 7 the Court con-
firmed a lower court decision ordering the registrar of
Washington Parish, La., to restore the names of Negro
citizens which had been challenged and stricken to the
voting rolls.
B. Protection from police brutality.
1945: Screws v. United States 8 represents one of the
most important of the cases involving civil rights. A Negro
prisoner was beaten to death by a sheriff, deputy sheriff,
and local police officer. No state or local action was started.
The Attorney General undertook prosecution under section
52 of the Criminal Code and the Supreme Court, although
divided over the meaning of the word "wilfulness," agreed
that such action by state officials was action "under color
of" state law and therefore a federal offense. This decision
has opened the way for federal protection against police
brutality.
s5321 U.S. 649 (1944).
86322 U.S. 385 (1944).
87362 U.S. 58 (1960).
88325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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C. Restrictive covenants.
1948: In Shelley v. Kramer 9 and Hurd v. Jlodge,90
the Court held that while racially restrictive covenants
among individuals were not unlawful, they were never-
theless unenforceable in any state or federal court.
1953: No white co-covenanter could be sued for dam-
ages in breaking a restrictive covenant 1
D. Segregation in the schools.
1950: The constitutionality of separate but equal schools
has been questioned for almost ten years now as various
Supreme Court decisions have defined the limitation of the
doctrine. In Sweatt v. Painter," the Court held that a
segregated law school could not be considered equal. In
MoLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,93 the Court further
held that when a Negro student was admitted to a formerly
white state graduate school because the Negro institution
had no courses in his field, the state institution could not
seat him separately or segregate him from his fellow students
in any way.
1954: In the well-known Brown v. Board of Educ.,94
the Supreme Court held that separate schools are inherently
unequal and therefore deprive those forced to attend them
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment.
1955: On May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court laid down
the rules for enforcement of the Brown opinion, stating
that steps should be taken "as are necessary and proper
to admit pupils to public schools on a racially non-discrim-
inatory basis with all deliberate speed." The district courts
were given the authority to uphold the decision in a manner
consistent with local conditions and problems. 5
89334 U.S. 1 (1948).
90334 U.S. 24 (1948).
91 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
92339 U.S. 629 (1950).
93339 U.S. 637 (1950).
94347 U.S. 483 (1954).
95 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
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1957: In one of its latest decisions, Pennsylvania v.
Board of City Trusts,96 the Supreme Court held that, despite
the founder's will, Girard College in Philadelphia could not
refuse to admit Negroes as long as it was administered by
an organ of the city government. Such discrimination
amounted to state denial of equal protection of the law and
therefore was in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
1958: Cooper v. Aaron 9 confirmed the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, denying
a request by the School Board of Little Rock, Arkansas,
that the operation of their desegregation plan be suspended
for two and one-half years in view of violent popular
objections. The Court held unanimously that "the Con-
stitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or
yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed
upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature."
1958: Shuttlesworth v. Board of Educ98 confirmed
that the Alabama School Placement Law could not be
regarded as unconstitutional on its face.
E. Segregation in interstate commerce.
1946: In Morgan v. Virginia,99 the Supreme Court
held invalid a Virginia statute requiring segregation on
interstate buses passing through the State.
1956: In South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Flem-
ming,' the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which declared a
South Carolina law requiring segregation on local buses.
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.
F. Segregation in the District of Columbia.
1953: The Court held in District of Columbia v. John
96353 U.S. 230 (1957).
97 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
98162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
99328 U.S. 373 (1946).
100351 U.S. 901 (1956).
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R. Thompson Co.' that an 1873 act of the Legislative
Assembly of the District which prohibited discrimination on
grounds of race or color in eating places remained still
valid despite non-use. Although the act was passed while
the District retained some local self-government, it had
not been repealed by Congress and therefore remained in
full force in the absence of further congressional action.
G. Public recreational facilities.
1955: In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v.
Dawson,102 the Court affirmed without opinion or citation
a ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
that racial segregation on public beaches was a denial
of equal protection of the law as outlined in the Brown
case.
1955: The Court also extended this holding to public
golf courses in Holmes v. City of Atlanta.'
H. Trial procedure.
1957: Eubanks v. Louisiana "04 involved the indictment
for murder of a -Negro in a parish in which Negroes had
been systematically excluded from grand jury duty. A
judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court, sustaining the
indictment, was reversed.
1959: The Supreme Court declined to review the
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case
of Harpole v. United States ex rel. Goldsby,1 5 ordering the
retrial of a Negro who had been convicted of murder by a
Mississippi jury from which Negroes had been systematically
excluded. Since Mississippi jurors are chosen from lists
of qualified electors, this case has a bearing on all con-
victions of Negroes in those Mississippi counties that have
no registered Negro voters.
101346 U.S. 100 (1953).
102350 U.S. 877 (1955).
103350 U.S. 879 (1955).
104356 U.S. 584 (1957).
105 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1959).
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THE CIVI RiGHTs ACT oi 1960
In 1957, a four-part civil rights program was sub-
mitted to Congress, providing for the creation of a bi-
partisan commission of a Civil Rights Division (replacing
the earlier created Civil Rights Section) in the Department
of Justice, and the amendment of existing laws to safe-
guard personal and voting rights of minorities through civil
procedures like the injunction.
On April 1, the full House Judiciary Committee re-
ported a new bill, H.R. 6127, containing the proposals of
the administration. The majority report stated that the
bill merely substituted civil proceedings for criminal pro-
ceedings without creating any new crimes or new state or
federal powers. "In the field of civil rights, the Federal
Government must assume the ultimate responsibility for the
protection of individuals when state and local enforcement
and protection of such rights fail." "I
Two minority reports criticized the measure as an
"unlimited grant of power to Federal authorities, abandon-
ment of the concept of State's sovereignty, and eradication
of trial by jury." Section III, giving the Attorney General
power to institute civil actions in the name of the United
States against persons engaged in, or about to be engaged
in, depriving another of the equal protection of the laws,
was described as "truly shocking." 107
After approval by the Judiciary Committee, the measure
was referred to the Committee on Rules and debate began
on June 5, 1957. Controversy centered around an effort
to attach a jury trial amendment to the Bill to insure
that persons accused of violating injunctions sought by the
Attorney General on the grounds that rights were being
denied would not be sentenced for contempt by a judge
without recourse to a jury. The jury trial amendment
was defeated on a roll call vote of 251 to 158. On June
106 See House Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Civil Rights to Ac-
company H.R. 6127 H.R. REP. No. 297, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
lO Id. at 45, 60.
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18, 1957, the Civil Rights Bill passed the House by a vote
of 286 to 126.
The Senate debate on civil rights began officially on
July 8. The Senate debate centered principally around
section III of the measure, which provided:
Whenever any persons have engaged or there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any persons are about to engage in any
acts or practices which would give rise to . . . [a denial of
the equal protection of the laws], the Attorney General may
institute for the United States . . . a civil action or other proper
proceeding for preventive relief, including an application for a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
order.
Opinion on this section was divided. Many Senators be-
lieved that such a provision would give the Attorney General
too much personal power in bringing suits against private
individuals for an offense, the denial of equal protection of
the laws, which by its very nature could be only loosely
defined. Supporters of section III pointed out that no new
offenses were listed, that the only change was to use civil
rather than criminal proceedings in enforcing the already
existing law. On July 24, the vote was taken on an amend-
ment sponsored by Senators Anderson (D-N.M.), Aiken
(R-Vt.) and Case (R-S.D.) to eliminate section III. The
amendment was accepted, and section III was deleted by
a vote of 52-38.
The next landmark in the debate was the vote on a
"jury trial amendment" sponsored by Senators Kefauver
(D-Tenn.), O'Mahoney (D-Wyo.) and Church (D-Idaho).
The amendment provided that jury trials would be available
where defendants who had violated injunctions were charged
with criminal rather than civil contempt of court. In other
words, in civil contempt cases where a defendant could at
any time purge himself of contempt by complying with
a court order, the judge could sentence without a jury,
but in criminal contempt cases, where a severe punishment
could be inflicted for past and irremediable disobedience to
the court's orders, a defendant could request a jury trial.
On August 2, the vote was taken and the O'Mahoney-
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Kefauver-Church amendment was passed by a vote of 51-42.
To the original amendment providing jury trials in criminal
contempt cases, a provision was added providing that
Negroes could not be eliminated from federal court juries
even if they were not registered voters and thus not eligible
as jurors under state law.
The Civil Rights Bill was passed by the Senate on
August 7, 1957 by a vote of 72-18. This was the first civil
rights legislation since 1875. After Senate passage of the
Civil Rights Act, the question of approval by the House
was raised. Since the House had defeated both of the
amendments-to eliminate section III and to add jury
trials-which the Senate had accepted, the question of a
joint conference to iron out differences arose. On August 13,
the House rejected alternative moves to send the bill to
conference or to accept Senate alterations. Action was
thus left up to the House Rules Committee.
On August 21, following an announcement from the
President that he would accept a compromise, such was
proposed, namely: In criminal contempt cases judges,
without juries, would be able to sentence offenders up to
ninety days in jail or a fine of $300; if the judge believed
a stronger penalty would be wise, he could impanel a jury
in which case penalties as high as six months in jail or
$1,000 could be imposed. Furthermore, the jury trial pro-
vision was applied to the terms of the Civil Rights Act
alone.
This suggestion, with the limitation of judge-imposed
sentences to forty-five days, was accepted by the leaders of
both parties. The climax to the debate was a filibuster of
24 hours and 22 minutes by Senator Strom Thurmond
(D-S.C.) against the bill.
The President signed the bill on September 9. He had
acquiesced in the deletion of section III because he implied
that there were certain aspects of it that he had not been
aware of, but he stood firm in opposing a jury trial amend-
ment that would mar the "effectiveness" of the right-to-
vote measure.
When the 86th Congress convened in January 1959,
the number of developments which had occurred since the
1963 ]
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enactment of the 1957 law gave indications that the 86th
Congress would receive additional civil rights legislation.
The Commission on Civil Rights had run into a number
of legal challenges in its efforts to investigate the denial
of voting rights. It was argued that the Commission's life
ought to be extended beyond the September 9, 1959 deadline.
The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice was
encountering difficulties in its efforts to enforce Negro
voting rights. The one suit that had been brought, directed
against the registrars of Terrell County, Georgia, was
dismissed in federal district court on the ground that the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 was unconstitutional. The decision
was appealed to the Supreme Court and eventually over-
ruled. A second action, brought on February 6, 1959 against
the registrars of Macon County, Alabama, was stymied by
the resignation of the county's registrars. A government
attempt to make the State of Alabama a defendant in the
suit was rejected by the federal district court and the
Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Supreme Court
ordered reinstatement of the suit on the basis of section
601(b) of the 1960 Act, which had been signed by the
President only ten days before the Court's decision on
May 16, 1960. These experiences were widely regarded as
an indication that further legislation was needed in order
to assure the effectiveness of the Civil Rights Division
of the Department of Justice.
School desegregation continued to be a major con-
troversy. By January 1959, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and Vrirginia were still
standing firm against any desegregation. In all of these
states, there appeared a readiness to sacrifice the public
school system in preference to accepting racially mixed
schools. As a result, there was sentiment in the 86th
Congress toward legislative action.
Racial tension had, on several occasions, erupted into
violence. In addition to mob action in connection with
school desegregation, there had been a number of bombing
attacks on schools, houses of worship and private residences.
In the four years preceding January 1959, four schools,
seven churches, and four Jewish religious centers-as well
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as numerous private residences-had been bombed. Many
members of Congress believed that federal legislation was
needed to combat it.
In the course of the month of January, a considerable
number of bills dealing with civil rights were introduced
in both chambers. House action started in Subcommittee
No. 5 of the Judiciary -Committee. On August 20, 1959,
the full House Judiciary Committee reported a "clean" bill
(H.R. 8601). From the Judiciary Committee, the bill
went to the House Rules Committee, which took no action
on it for the remainder of the first session of the 86th
Congress. A discharge petition failed to get enough sig-
natures to bring the civil rights measure to the floor of
the House before Congress adjourned on September 15, 1959.
In the Senate, meanwhile, the Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee reported
a skeleton bill to the full committee on July 15, 1959.
The bill contained only two provisions: one to require the
preservation of voting records, and the other to extend the
Civil Rights Commission until January 1961. The Judiciary
Committee did not complete its consideration of the bill
in time to bring the measure to the floor before adjournment.
After the 86th Congress reconvened on January 6, 1960,
House proponents of civil rights legislation made determined
efforts to gather the necessary 219 signatures to discharge
the Rules Committee from further consideration of the civil
rights bill. By February 18, 1960, the House Rules Com-
mittee cleared the bill for debate on the floor of the House.
This development came three days after the Senate had
started its scheduled civil rights debate, exactly as had
been promised during the first session of the 86th Con-
gress by Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and Minority
Leader Everett Dirksen.
The Senate took up the civil rights issue, as scheduled,
on February 15, 1960 by opening to civil rights amend-
ments an unrelated House-passed bill, dealing with the
leasing of an unused building at Fort Crowder, Mo., to
serve as a temporary school for the town of Stella, Mo.
By this parliamentary device, the Senate leadership was
able to disregard the minor civil rights measure before the
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Judiciary Committee since July 15, 1959, and provided
a means to bring a more complete civil rights program
directly to the floor of the Senate.
The Senators from nine Southern states (Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia) were unalterably
opposed to the civil rights proposals under discussion and
invoked the Senate rules allowing unlimited debate to the
fullest extent possible. This strategy resulted in a stale-
mate which lasted until March 24, when the Senate
dropped the bills then before it in order to take up the
House measure. All in all, the Senate debated civil rights
for thirty-seven days (February 15 to April 8) and held
around-the-clock sessions for nine days (February 29 to
March 8). The nine-day period was interrupted by only
two recesses, and was marked by one unbroken session
lasting 82 hours and 2 minutes (March 2 to 5). At the
end of this period, a bipartisan coalition of pro-civil rights
Senators attempted to break the stalemate by invoking the
cloture rule. Their petition was defeated by a vote of
42 to 53, which was 22 votes short of the necessary two-
thirds of the Senators present and voting.
The Senate debate during the period produced few
concrete results. Liberal attempts to broaden the bill,
as well as Southern attempts to weaken it, were voted
down. On March 17 the Senate adopted a broad anti-
bombing provision dealing with all types of bombing
attacks as well as with the transportation of explosives
across state lines. This was the only section of the Senate
bill on which agreement could be reached.
The House took up its bill (H.R. 8601) on March 10.
Since the bill as reported by the Judiciary and Rules
Committees contained no voting provision, the House was
primarily concerned with adding a voting registration plan
to the bill under discussion.
A voting referee plan became the subject of a three-
sided controversy. It was attacked by Southern House
members, who sought to eliminate or weaken it, and by
advocates of stronger civil rights legislation, who favored
the registrar proposal or a plan calling for the appoint-
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ment by the President of federal enrollment officers in
areas of voting discrimination. It was favored by many
of the liberal House members, who objected to the ex-
clusively judicial character of the referee plan. The
three-cornered nature of the controversy almost led to
the rejection of the entire voting provision of the civil
rights bill. In the end, however, Northern House liberals
decided to support the referee plan, thus assuring its pas-
sage. Before doing so, the liberals pressed successfully
for the adoption of a strengthening amendment, providing
for the provisional acceptance of ballots cast by persons
who had applied for registration to a voting referee twenty
or more days before the election, and whose application
had been challenged and was still pending. In cases where
the application had been filed less than twenty days before
the election, the applicant could be permitted to vote at
the discretion of the court. The amendment also restored
some measure of the referee's power to supervise voting
and ballot counting.
After narrowly escaping an amendment that would
have limited its effect to federal elections, the voting
referee provision was adopted by the House on March 23
by a vote of 295 to 124. One day later, the House passed
H.R. 8601, as amended, by a vote of 311 to 109.
As soon as the House completed action on H.R. 8601,
the Senate dropped its own bill and took up the House
measure. It was referred to the Judiciary Committee with
instructions that it be reported back to the Senate no
later than midnight, March 29. The Judiciary Committee
held hearings, and wrote amendments to every section
of the bill. The full Senate began consideration of H.R.
8601 on March 30. The debate, most of which dealt with
the voting referee plan, lasted until April 8.
On April 8, the Senate passed H.R. 8601 by a vote
of 71 to 18, and sent it back to the House for concurrence
in the changes that had been made. The bill was cleared
by the House Rules Committee on April 19, and passed
by the House on April 21. The final vote was 288 to 95.
The act was signed by the President on May 6, 1960.
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Many states and communities followed the lead of
Congress in development of equal rights and opportunities.
Prohibiting segregation in housing in urban renewal oper-
ations has become a prime source of equality legislation.
The first really comprehensive anti-discrimination hous-
ing law enacted was the Colorado Fair Housing Act of
1959.108 This Act prohibits unlawful discrimination in
the sale, rental or leasing of all housing accommodations
(with the exception of owner-occupied dwellings), where
such housing was erected with public assistance. It covers
financial institutions as well as those persons who aid or
abet in any housing discrimination. Any oral or written
inquiry or record concerning race, creed, color, sect, na-
tionality origin, or ancestry is outlawed.
Connecticut's anti-discrimination statutes 109 guarantee
"all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be
entitled to full and equal accommodations in every place
of public accommodation, resort, or amusement, subject only
to the conditions and limitations established by law and
applicable alike to all persons; and any denial of such
accommodation by reason of race, creed or color of the
applicant therefor, shall be a violation of the provisions
of this section. Any discrimination, segregation or separa-
tion on account of race, creed, or color, shall be a violation
of this section. .... "
It is generally conceded that the test of the Con-
necticut statutes applies to "all of the forms of publicly
assisted housing accommodations or building lots ....
which include urban renewal programs, publicly assisted
housing, and would likewise apply to private housing,
provided that such private housing is . . . one of three
or more housing accommodations or building lots, all of
which are located on a single parcel of land. .... "
In addition to the two foregoing states, California,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts,I Michigan, Min-
nesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York,
108 COLO. REv. STAT. §§69-7-1 to -7 (1959).
09 Gen. Stats. of Conn. Laws of 1961, Public Act 472, § 1.
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Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virgin Islands, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin have enacted statutes prohibiting
discrimination, in varying degrees, in housing.
Many cities also have coped with the problem of
discrimination in housing. Included among these cities
that have enacted ordinances prohibiting discrimination in
housing are Los Angeles, California; Denver, Colorado;
Des Moines, Iowa; New York City; Cleveland, Ohio;
Dayton, Ohio; Hamilton, Ohio; Toledo, Ohio; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Providence,
Rhode Island."'
Action against discrimination in housing reached its
climax on November 20, 1962 when President Kennedy,
after exhaustive and comprehensive study and analysis,
issued Executive Order No. 11063, directing the full weight
of the federal government against discrimination in housing
and related facilities, which utilized, under existing laws
of the United States, federal financing assistance, directly
or indirectly.'
Tm CURRENT FEDERAL TREND
In addition to the Executive Order banning discrim-
ination in housing, the calendar years 1961 and 1962 reflect
a remarkable growth in the field of individual equality
and freedom. The keynote of progress in the field of civil
rights during these two years was sounded by President
Kennedy during the campaign of 1960, when he said:
I believe in an America where religious intolerance will steadily
end-where all men and all churches are treated as equal-where
every man has the same right to attend or not attend the church
of his choice-where there is no anti-Catholic vote, no block voting
of any kind-and where Catholics, Protestants and Jews, at both
110A comprehensive catalog of state statutes and local ordinances prohibit-
ing discrimination in housing is found in INTER-GRouP RELATIONs SERVIcE,
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U. S. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE
AGENCY, STATE STATUTES AND LOCAL ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS PRO-
HIBITING DISCIMINATION IN HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL OPERATIONS
(rev. ed. 1961).
"'lExec. Order No. 11063 (1962).
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lay and pastoral level will refrain from those attitudes of disdain
and division which so often have marred their works in the past.
At the conclusion of the calendar year 1961, a report
of the Attorney General of the United States to the
President of the United States on the activities of the
Department of Justice in the field of civil rights was made,
which included summaries on voting, employment, trans-
portation, schools and other matters of general interest in
the field of civil rights, which report indicates clearly the
increasing activity of the federal government in this area.
Climaxing two years of progress by the Department of
Justice-and in a sense finalizing a century of development
-the Attorney General of the United States, on January
26, 1963, reported to the President on the subject of civil
rights, which in part is as follows:
For those only interested in headlines, rioting and violence at
the University of Mississippi overshadowed the civil rights field
and painted 1962 as a year of resistance by the South to law
and the orders of our courts. The historian, however, will find,
on the contrary, that 1962 was a year of great progress in civil
rights, in large measure because of the responsibility and respect
for law displayed by the great majority of the citizens of the
South. In 1962, the United States took major steps toward equal
opportunity and equal rights for all our citizens and in every area
of civil rights-whether voting, transportation, education, employ-
ment, or housing.
Voting. The Attorney General's report is to the effect
that voting is the most significant civil rights problem.
It is the policy of the administration in this sensitive area
to consult with local officials in an effort to secure voluntary
compliance with the law. During the Kennedy administra-
tion, officials in twenty-nine counties in Southern states
have made voting records available to the Department of
Justice--without the need for court action. Many other
counties have ceased to enforce a policy of segregated
balloting in voluntary compliance with a court decision in
one county.
In the past two years, twenty-three voting suits have
been filed and sixty-two voting records inspections have been
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undertaken. On July 28, 1960, Negroes voted in East
Carroll Parish, Louisiana for the first time since Recon-
struction. Negro registration in Bullock County, Alabama,
has risen from a total of five in September 1961 to more
than one thousand. Between late 1960 and the present,
the number of Negroes registered in Haywood County,
Tennessee, has risen from none to over two thousand.
It seems clear that significant progress has been made
and will continue to be made. In 1962, Congress adopted
the anti-poll tax constitutional amendment, but unfortun-
ately, did not enact legislation forbidding the discriminatory
use of voting qualification tests. Additional legislation is
necessary to insure voting freedom-especially in those areas
where large numbers of Negroes are being deprived of their
right to register and vote because of racial bias.
Transportation. The report of the Attorney General
indicates his belief that at the present time, segregation in
interstate commerce has ceased to exist. There are no
segregated airport facilities in the nation. Only in Jack-
son, Mississippi, is systematic segregation at interstate rail
and bus facilities attempted, and legal action is already
in progress to halt that practice. The report emphasizes
that the great progress in this area is largely the result of
voluntary compliance with law and regulations by local
officials and citizens.
Education. In 1962, the number of desegregated school
districts increased from 912 to 972. In each of these
districts, desegregation was accomplished without incident.
Federal activity in the admission of James Meredith to the
University of Mississippi has been well-documented. Where
negotiations with local officials have failed, suits have been
instituted regarding Prince George County, Virginia; Hunts-
vile and Mobile, Alabama; Gulfport and Biloxi, Mississippi;
and Bossier Parish, Louisiana.
The report singled out Prince Edward County, Virginia,
for special attention, pointing out that its public schools
have been closed since 1959 in order to avoid court desegra-
gation orders. Fifteen hundred of the eighteen hundred
school-age Negro children in the county are without an
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education. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has been requested to order the schools opened promptly
without racial segregation.
Employment. The Department points out that its policy
of seeking qualified personnel regardless of race has resulted
in notable gains for Negroes in the offices of United States
Attorneys and Marshals in the Nation's ninety-two judicial
districts. Of thirty-two Negro Assistant United States
Attorneys appointed during this administration, sixteen were
appointed in 1962. Of fourteen Negro Deputy United States
Marshals appointed in this administration, eleven were ap-
pointed in 1962. There were ten Negro attorneys in the
Department of Justice at the beginning of the administra-
tion; there are now more than seventy.
Other Areas. The Department has also been active in
regard to the problem of "sit-in" convictions, desegregation
of hospitals built with federal financial assistance, employ-
ment discrimination, police brutality and other suspected
discriminatory practices.
The report concluded:
1962 was a year of progress for the United States in the
field of civil rights. This is not to say the problems are dis-
appearing. They remain, and they remain difficult-not only
in the South, with open discrimination, but throughout the country
where Negroes are the victims of school "resegregation," bias in
housing or employment or other facets of society. Ugly incidents
like the Mississippi riot may occur again.
But we are accelerating our progress. Again, let me say
this acceleration occurs in large measure because of the emerging
spirit of the South. In 1962 this spirit was not the brutal one
of rioting and violence at the University of Mississippi. The
spirit was that exemplified in Georgia last week by Governor
Carl E. Sanders, in his inaugural address. "We revere the past,"
he said. "We adhere to the values of respectability and responsibility
which constitute our tradition." Then he added, "We believe in
law and order and in the principle that all laws apply equally
to all citizens."
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Possibly the greatest achievement of the months since
January 1961, has been the establishment of a new and
positive attitude in the Nation. There has been created
among federal policy makers a sense of obligation to civil
rights, and new, higher standards against which to measure
that obligation. Decisions made and procedures formed
will certainly provide a built-in alertness to the problems
and to the opportunities for advance. Perhaps as important
as anything else, there is an air of under'standing toward
the civil rights movement, which makes possible the dis-
cussion of civil rights as a national concern and not merely
a narrow, limited, so-called color line issue.
This spirit of obligation is evident in the government's
drive to recruit and advance Negro civil servants, an action
which is not only important in itself but which will do much
to assure momentum. Other substantial actions, large and
small, include:
a) President Kennedy's correction of the Civil War
Centennial Commission;
b) the Department of Interior's order making non-
discrimination in recreational use a condition of -purchase
of forest reserves offered to state and local governments;
c) Secretary of Interior Udall's insistence that the
Washington Redskins either hire Negro players or not use
the capitol's new stadium;
d) the ordering of a Yellowstone Park concessionaire
to hire qualified Negroes;
e) a Defense Department directive forbidding the
use of military police to "quell affrays" on behalf of local
authorities in support of segregation "or other forms of
racial discrimination"; local commanders are instructed ta
monitor carefully any legal actions against servicemen grow-
ing from enforcement of discrimination, and to provide legal
assistance if necessary to assure due process;
f) the requiring of civil defense training carried on
under Defense Department auspices to be non-segregated;
g) a Department of Defense memorandum of November
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7, 1961, expressing concern over the small number of Negro
officers, and directing attention be given to their recruitment;
h) the instruction of Peace Corps trainees in the ex-
tent and causes of discrimination.
These acts illustrate a seriousness of purpose. The
administration's use of executive powers has brought new
vitality to the civil rights struggle, and new hope that
America may soon overcome this old dilemma. The qualities
which seem to be most characteristic of the administration's
program during 1961-1963 are as follows:
a) Enforcement of federal laws and defense of federal
authority have been vigorous.
b) A concern for true civil rights has been built into
the federal government, and should give steady movement
to a broad civil rights advance.
c) In the South, the administration has had almost
no goal except compliance with federal law. It has not,
in schools or any other area, exerted its influence in behalf
of integration, beyond respect for law.
d) The administration has developed strong and ef-
fective policies in the field of contractor employment.
The housing issue is an appropriate concluding note for
a study of the concept of executive action, and what has
been accomplished by it. For housing, more than any other
issue, raises the fundamental questions. Here looms the
true civil rights problem, namely, whether this nation wants
to confront and solve the racial conflict that has bedeviled
and tortured our history. And in the problem of housing
is the question of where a family may live and raise its
children. Government can give no higher service than
the creation of environments in which the Nation's in-
dividuals can live with each other in trust and good
will.
The First Nine Months- a report of the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, issued
January 15, 1962, a summarization of Executive leadership
- is a report in which heartening results are found. In
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its first nine months of operation, the President's Com-
mittee on Equal Employment Opportunity has made signif-
icant progress toward insuring equal employment oppor-
tunity, without regard to race, creed, color or national
origin, both in government employment and in government
contract employment.
Without discounting the importance and development
of civil rights, as achieved through the numerous "Prayer
Marches" of Albany, Georgia, "Freedom Rides," etc., by
far the most explosive and perhaps the most misunderstood
incident occurring during the past two calendar years, is
the difficulties surrounding the admission of James Meredith
as a student of the University of Mississippi during the
latter part of September and the first of October, 1962.
In an address to the Yale Law School Association of Wash-
ington, D. C., on November 20, 1962, Burke Marshall,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, pointed
out quite clearly the immense importance of the federal
government's participation in the litigation of Meredith v.
Fair:
Whatever the cost in bitterness and injury to persons and
property, I think that it is a tribute to this nation's respect
for the law-unmatched in history and unmatched in any other
country-that the decision by an individual to assert his rights
under the law could by itself invoke the great exercise of judicial
and executive authority which was finally called upon to enforce
the rights of James Meredith. 112
The pursuit of a goal of individual equality during
these past two years has not been mere whim or fancy,
or a matter of temporary expediency. Rather there has
been a progression of conviction and idealism. Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy, in addressing the American
Jewish Congress on October 28, 1962, drew attention to
this deep democratic conviction, as he said:
112 Mr. Marshall's narrative of the events which led to the admission of
James Meredith to the University of Mississippi have generated such great
interest that his speech has been substantially reproduced in an Appendix
to this article.
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The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet
Union is in reality a confrontation of all people who believe in
human dignity and freedom with those who believe the State
is Supreme. It is that fact, not the drama of the particular moment,
which is of real significance.
In our society, laws are administered to protect and expand
individual freedom, not to compel individuals to follow the logic
other men impose on them.
The purpose of these ideals, and indeed, the reason
for them, is not of recent discovery, as is reflected in an
address by the Attorney General at Law Day Exercises of
the University of Georgia Law School, on May 6, 1961,
where he said:
[T]he time has long since arrived when loyal Americans must
measure the impact of their actions beyond the limits of their
own towns or states. For instance, we must be quite aware
of the fact that 50% of the countries in the United Nations are
not white; that around the world, in Africa, South America and
Asia, people whose skins are a different color than ours are on
the move to gain their measure of freedom and liberty.
When parents send their children to school this fall in Atlanta,
peaceably and in accordance with the rule of law, barefoot Burmese
and Congolese will see before their eyes Americans living by the
rule of law.
WFS VIRGINIA TODAY AND CIVIL RIGHTS
During the past two years West Virginia has not been
unmindful of its heritage in this all-encompassing field of
civil rights; the Mountain State has not rested upon its
historic laurels and has not failed to keep abreast of
progress in this basic quest for human rights, consistently
searching out neglected areas needing attention.
The West Virginia Advisory Committee (in its 1961
report to the Commission on Civil Rights) based its report
on studies conducted by its subcommittees on housing,
local administration of justice, and education. In addition,
the Committee obtained up-to-date voter registration statis-
tics broken down by race.
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In the study of administration of justice, the West
Virginia Advisory Committee surveyed the instrumentalities
of law enforcement agencies, court administrative organiza-
tions, prosecuting attorneys' agencies and penal institutions.
In analysis, the West Virginia Committee recognized "that
. . . concerning the penal institutions . . . token integra-
tion has been undertaken but that substantial progress
in this area has not been made."
In the field of law enforcement,
the Subcommittee was advised that each applicant for employment
(with the Department of Safety (State Police)) was given every
consideration and that no Negro applicants had ever been rejected
by reason of race. The Subcommittee suggests that this picture
of employment is not consistent with the proposition that dis-
crimination in employment does not exist in this department,
and submits that this situation commends itself to the immediate
attention of the Commission and its State Advisory Committee....
It is urged that this Committee actively encourage the elimination
of what appears to be an employment barrier for Negroes in the
Department of Public Safety.
The West Virginia Advisory Committee, through the
use of extensive questionnaires and personal interviews,
was able to particularize patterns of desegregation -in-
tegration as being evident in the school systems of the
various counties. Patterns of development which emerged
from this study indicate the following course of integrated
education in West Virginia:
1. School system is completely desegregated, with reassign-
ment of Negro teachers on the basis of qualifications and needs
of the system. Negro students attend the school nearest their
homes. Race is not a factor in assigning children to special
schools.
2. School system completely desegregated, but the Negro teachers
have been reassigned only to certain schools within the
school system. Race is not a factor in assigning children to special
schools.
3. Negro students are permitted to attend schools nearest their
homes, but no Negro teachers have been reassigned and distributed
throughout the system.
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4. Negroes are not prevented from attending "white" schools,
but neither are they encouraged to do so. The staffs of the Negro
schools have been left intact and assigned only to the former Negro
schools.
5. Negro teachers have been reassigned experimentally and
token numbers of Negro students have been accepted in former
white schools.
In the field of voting in West Virginia, it would appear
from the estimated figures obtained from the West Virginia
Secretary of State that the white voting population in
West Virginia, as of May 1961, was 1,013,595 white reg-
istered voters, as compared with 49,802 Negro voters.
Employment practices in the Mountain State with
regard to Negro workers reflected, to the Advisory Com-
mittee, that Negroes employed constituted 9.4% of all
employees in agencies under State auspices, a proportion
which is higher than the Negro percentage population
(5.77%), but slightly lower than the percentage of Negroes
in the national labor force. The Committee concluded:
"In terms of numerical representation, the situation of the
State agencies with regard to the use of Negro workers
seems favorable . . . the findings indicate the possibility
that Negro workers were being selected for different types
of jobs than their white counterparts."
It appeared to the West Virginia Committee that
"Negro workers were found at levels compromising the
semi-skilled, service, and unskilled jobs." Negro worker
performance was evaluated by the Committee to be satis-
factory in terms of job efficiency, regularity and dependa-
bility. 82' to 88% of the agencies evaluated the Negro
workers as either the "same" or "better" than white workers.
In concluding its evaluation and study of the Negro
employment picture in West Virginia, the Committee found
"some practical difficulties are being faced by the agencies,
however, in the fuller use of Negro workers. About 30%
of the agencies mentioned difficulties deriving from their
experience, most prominent among which were finding
qualified Negro applicants, and placing Negro workers in
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jobs which would match their level of skill, education and
experience."
To the observer of the West Virginia effort, the popula-
tion statistics, by race, for 1950 and 1960 are especially
revealing.
The following is a chart of population statistics for
West Virginia by race:
Percent
1950 1960 Decrease
TOTALS .............................. 2,005,552 1,860,421 7.2
W hite ...................................... 1,890,282 1,770,133 6.4
Nonwhite .............................. 115,270 90,288 21.7
Negro ...................................... 114,867 89,378 22.2
Indian ...................................... 160 181 ........
Japanese .................................. 46 176 ........
Chinese .................................... 99 138 ........
Filipino 1 ......................................... 105 ........
All other ................................ 98 310 ........
Not available
The foregoing statistics demonstrate that the nonwhite
population has been departing from West Virginia at a
rate exceeding three times the departure of the white popu-
lation. Observers indicate that this exodus of both white
and nonwhite population is attributable to mechanization
and non-development of the natural resources and industries
of West Virginia.
During the 1961 session of the West Virginia Legis-
lature, further advances of a solid, permanent nature were
made with the creation of a Human Rights Commission."3
Heralded as an advance in the field of individual liberties,
the Human Rights Commission legislation has not been
without criticism, particularly the elimination from the
Commission of subpoena, investigative and other enforce-
ment powers, originally included in the bill creating the
113W. VA. CoDE ch. 5, art. 11 (1961).
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Commission. It would seem that an analysis of criticism
of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission legislation
is to the effect that it permits the Commission only to "con-
sider" complaints of racial, religious or ethnic discrimination
in employment and places of public accommodation, and
to some it would seem better to have "more teeth" placed
in the hands of the Human Rights Commission. Proponents
of the existing legislation point out, however, that the
methodical, unemotional, deliberate and studious approach
to individual liberty in West Virginia, as afforded by the
existing legislation, creates a more objective atmosphere
in which objective forums for evaluation and study can be
held, without the risk of radical approaches to a concerning
problem.
Opponents as well as proponents of the existing West
Virginia legislation agree that West Virginia's lawmakers
have taken a proper step, and have advanced the cause of
human equality in a positive manner. It is not likely that
an immature thrust can or will be made toward civil
rights questions presented for solution.
It is hoped that the early history of West Virginia
will serve as a forceful guide to the necessity of civil rights
development in the future in all areas of the Union. It is
felt that the progress of civil rights in West Virginia-
perhaps the most basic element of West Virginia's existence
-has given to the Mountain State a well-rounded philosophy
of human rights. Respectable authority confirms that
without the philosophic basis of human rights which is
West Virginia's heritage, West Virginia could not have
overcome the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to its exist-
ence. Most assuredly, 'est Virginia could not have de-
veloped its political and governmental structure to the
extent that West Virginia today is one of the few areas
in the Nation which has a minimum of current civil rights
problems.
During its period of existence, West Virginia has faced
the determinative problems of individual liberty and within
the concept of its creation has quickly and affirmatively
answered these problems. It would be foolhardy to contend
that the history of West Virginia is devoid of instances
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of civil rights hypocrisy. It would also be foolhardy not
to comment that West Virginia has had less civil rights
hypocrisy than most areas of the Nation. West Virginia's
development has been grounded upon solid concepts of in-
dividual liberties, and the minimal hypocrisy through the
years has quickly been dissipated; basic answers and de-
terminations have been sought.
Where other areas are now passing through the agoniz-
ing and torturous growing pains of civil rights incidents,
West Virginia has suffered these tribulations, but in the
last 100 years, and with the profit of Civil War tragedies,
West Virginia's citizens have emerged more experienced,
more mature, and perhaps more objective to the problems
that are now being resolved in other areas, sometimes with
emotional bitterness and conflict, but more often with
consideration, concern and perhaps more importantly, with
conscience.
A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE
It is, however, not enough that we pride ourselves on
today's achievements or yesterday's accomplishments, but
it is more important that we take a long and serious look
into the future to ensure that the experiences and hard-
ships of yesteryear, and of the present, will not be repeated;,
that the goals of our Republic can be achieved in every
remaining area; that the accomplishments of the past can
be preserved to the future.
As we approach the beginning of the second one hundred
years of West Virginia's existence, it is not only proper
and natural but very important that we look, as best we
can, into the second century. Unless we can resolve this
number one domestic problem of civil rights early in this
second century, not only will democracy completely bog
,down, but the Christian principles upon which true dem-
•ocracy is founded will have failed in their mission and
the civilization of man will be returned to the earliest
pages of recorded history.
Believing, however, that the experiences of yesteryear
will be the foundation for the judgments of tomorrow, it
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seems certain that each political subdivision of the Union
will join with West Virginia during this new century and
the United States will assume a commanding leadership
for the world in the expansion of individual liberty and
equality, regardless of any past or present limitations. We
cannot enter this second century believing that continued
effort, sacrifice and hardship are unnecessary for the
fullest achievement of these goals. There are other and
further considerations that must be faced with realism.
First: For as long as there are people, there will be
individual problems involving personal rights of liberty and
equality. These rights, now well established within the
concept of our Constitution and existing laws, will be in
a sense expanded but not so as to create an imbalance of
individual rights as compared with individual responsibilities
and obligations.
It is reasonable to presume that the second century of
West Virginia's existence will see the Nation-indeed, per-
haps every nation of the world-solving most of the basic,
as distinguished from the particular or individual, civil
rights problems. The present and future generations of
America will commence this new century seeking to mark
a new reach into freedom-an unparalleled thrust towards
full realization of equal opportunity for all American
citizens. The effort toward achievement of this goal will
cause the United States to remain a world leader, an ex-
ample for developing nations of the world to strive for
in the achievement of individual freedom and equality.
Second: During the coming century, in every area
where freedom has its deepest meaning to the individual-
in his job, in his neighborhood, his school or college, his
community facilities and accommodations, and in his par-
ticipation in the democratic processes-determined efforts,
coupled with renewed vigor, will bring American practices
ever closer to American ideals. The broad hopes of the
mid-twentieth century generation will evolve from dreams
and visions to action and finally fulfillment. The vision
of an America where intolerance and segregation is a
memory, and where every American has a free and equal
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chance to realize his own individual talents and possibilities,
will become a fact.
Meaning and effect will be given to the thoughts of
the present Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, who,
in a speech at the Seattle World's Fair, August 7, 1962,
said: "We cannot stand idly by and expect our dreams
to come true under their own power. The future is not
a gift; it is an achievement. Every generation helps make
its own future. This is the essential challenge of the
-present."
Third: During the coming century, the major respon-
sibility for developing these rights and responsibilities to
fruition will rest most heavily upon the legal profession.
It is the members of the legal profession who, through words
and conduct, daily convey to the rest of the community an
understanding of the meaning of the rule of law and of
the importance of an independent judicial branch in our
democratic society. It is the responsibility of the legal
profession during the coming century to point out to the
many honest and tolerant people of the world who think
that civil rights problems are the creation and plaything of
the liberals, that this is not true, but rather that civil
Tights problems are national, economic, social and legal
-problems.
We cannot hope to enter into this new century with
the illusion that basic social, economic, philosophical and
political questions have all been laid at rest; that these
future issues will not leave our communities deeply divided;
that these issues will not continue to arouse our deepest
emotions; that these issues and their resolution-one way
or the other-will not write the future history of our
country and, in fact, of the world.
Fourth: It would seem, with the realization that most
of the basic, fundamental civil rights problems of all citizens
will be settled during the coming one hundred years, that
there is presented a further obligation to the legal profession.
That duty is to raise the level of public discussion of the
cases that come before the courts on the fundamental
problems of individual dignity, and for us, as lawyers, to
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point out the subtlety of the questions presented to the
courts, the inherent limitations of every judicial decision,
and the differences that are apparent to us between the
"edicts of Solomon" and the decisions of the courts under
the laws of our land. Fortunately, for the development
of a true democratic society, the growth of our law his-
torically has each decision confined to the specific facts
and the specific procedure that frames the issues, thus
presenting the pertinent question of law. The legal pro-
fession can do much to make it clear that there are few,
very few, cases where the decisions from our courts can
or should give answers to questions that are all clear, all
one way, or all the other. Whatever our differences may
be on any of the substantive issues, we surely share a
common conviction that we do a disservice to the cause of
freedom if we turn away from the teaching and habit of
voluntary compliance with decisions written into law by
established constitutional instrumentalities.
Fifth: Of at least equal, and perhaps paramount
magnitude, the legal profession has the obligation to vig-
orously impress upon those for whom rights, privileges,
equality and dignity are achieved that they must assume
those rights with an awareness of their attendant and
equally important obligations and responsibilities.
It will be a hollow victory for individual dignity, and
will be the certain destruction of the democratic civilization
of the world, if our system of government (1) provides the
full opportunity of education, and we do not become learned;
(2) maintains and provides an independent judiciary, and
we flout the rule of law; (3) maintains and provides free
elections and the right to participate, but we forfeit that
franchise of freedom by inaction on election day; (4)
provides protection to life and property, and we chose to
join mob "justice"; (5) assures equal job opportunity,
and we fail to fairly bargain and fail to enthusiastically
perform assignments in the true spirit and meaning of co-
operative undertaking; (6) guarantees religious freedom,
and we refuse to participate in or recognize the necessity
and courage of religious conviction; (7) provides equal
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housing opportunities, but as individuals, we fail to better
our environment and improve our way of life, commensurate
with the opportunities available; or (8) provides relief from
occasions of economic oppression, and we employ these
programs as a means of greater dependence with no thought
of self improvement or the future use of individual initiative
and personal usefulness to either self, family or Nation.
In short, as we obtain the basic rights inherent to each
individual in a free society, if we do not buttress those
rights with an enthusiastic acceptance of the accompanying
personal, individual obligations, then the framing of the
Constitution, the legislative processing of civil rights laws,
the War Between the States; the ravaging and hardships
in West V7irginia's history, and the human misery and
suffering of more than a century in these United States
will have been in vain, and we will have lost the heritage
of our nation. The legal profession's responsibility in the
coming century will be to develop an awareness of the
meaning of hard-won individual liberties, plus an eternal
vigilance for new horizons of human dignity to be sought
after and conquered.
APPENDIX
The following is the text of an address by Assistant Attorney
General Burke Marshall, Civil Rights Division, given to the Yale
Law School Association of Washington, D.C., on November 20, 1962:
The event which put the machinery of our law into motion was
the private decision of James Meredith in January of 1961 to apply
for admission to the University of Mississippi. It was his decision-
not that of any organization- and it was made wholly without con-
sultation with any part of the government.
Whatever the cost in bitterness and injury to persons and property,
I think it is a tribute to this Nation's respect for the law- unmatched
in history and unmatched in any other country- that the decision
by an individual to assert his rights under the law could by itself
invoke the great exercise of judicial and executive authority which
was finally called upon to enforce the rights of James Meredith.
His decision resulted in the case of Meredith v. Fair, which was
filed on May 31, 1961 against the Board of Trustees and other of-
ficials of the University of Mississippi. They were represented by
the legal officers of the State of Mississippi. As is clear from the
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subsequent history of the case, the University and the State had their
full day in court, not once but a number of times.
The only defense available, and the only defense raised, was that
the University of Mississippi was not a segregated institution; that
the University officials stood ready to admit any qualified Negro;
and that their refusal to admit Meredith had nothing whatsoever to
do with his race. During the proceedings witness after witness for
the University took the stand under oath and testified to this effect.
This was the reason, and the only reason, ever put to the courts for
denying Meredith admission to the University.
Meredith sought first to enter in the summer session of 1961,
and then again in the fall session of that same year. Delays sought by
the attorneys for the State and the University were effective in pre-
venting any decision in the case until December 12. On that date the
District Court denied a motion for preliminary injunction, finding as
a fact that the University of Mississippi was not segregated.
Counsel for Meredith then made an effort to speed up the legal
processes. They asked the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to
reverse and require the lower court to enter a preliminary injunction
in time to permit Meredith's admission to the term of the University
beginning on February 6, 1962. They were unsuccessful. On January
12, 1962, the Court of Appeals denied any interim order, but reversed
and remanded with instructions to the District Court to hold a prompt
hearing.
On February 3, after a full trial, Judge Mize again decided that
Meredith had failed to prove that the University was segregated.
Counsel for Meredith made a further effort to obtain from the Court
of Appeals an order requiring Meredith's admission during that term
of the University. Again they failed. On February 13, the Court of
Appeals denied Meredith's motion for injunction pending appeal.
One of the issues raised on the record was whether the University
had properly denied admission to Meredith because he registered to
vote as a resident of Hinds County, Mississippi, when in fact he was
a resident of Attala County. In early June, while this question was
pending before the Court of Appeals, a criminal action based upon
these same facts was instituted against Meredith in Hinds County
for making a false registration application. This was the first of four
criminal actions brought against Meredith by local government units in the
State of Mississippi on this charge. On June 13, the Court of Appeals
issued an injunction in aid of its jurisdiction prohibiting the prosecu-
tion of the criminal proceedings against Meredith.
The Court of Appeals finally decided the case on its merits on
June 25, 1962, more than a year after the case was filed. Its opinion
by Judge John Minor Wisdom of Louisiana noted what everyone in
the State of Mississippi then knew, and every one in the United
States now knows, that the University of Mississippi, under the
policies of the State of Mississippi, was a segregated institution which
would not admit any Negro without a court order. The court
found that the charge of wilful, false voter registration by Meredith
was frivolous. It remanded the case to the District Court with instruc-
tions to issue the injunction asked for in the complaint.
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This order was issued shortly before the summer session at the
University of Mississippi began. Counsel for Meredith made another
effort to expedite the processes of the courts to permit Meredith to
enter the University at that time. The Court of Appeals rejected this
request also, denying a motion that its mandate issue immediately.
In due course the mandate of the Court of Appeals issued. On
July 18, Judge Ben Cameron of the Fifth Circuit granted a stay on
motion of the defendants, without notice to counsel for Meredith,
without a record, without notice to the panel of the Court of Appeals
which had sat on the appeal, and without any publication. The stay
was discovered only by reason of a routine inquiry made to the Dis-
trict Court asking when the court's order would issue in accordance
with the mandate.
There followed a most unusual sequence of orders.
On July 27, the Court of Appeals vacated Judge Cameron's stay,
recalled its mandate and issued a new mandate requiring a more
specific order for Meredith's admission to the University in September.
On July 28, the Court of Appeals also issued its own injunction pend-
ing prompt issuance of, and compliance with, the injunction of the
District Court.
On the same day Judge Cameron stayed the order of the Court
of Appeals of the previous day. Again this was done without notice.
And on July 31, Judge Cameron stayed the court's order of July 28.
On August 4, the Court of Appeals vacated the two latest stays by
Judge Cameron and reinstated its own orders. Two days later Judge
Cameron issued another stay staying all prior orders of the Court
of Appeals.
After this fourth stay, it was apparent that Judge Cameron would
not follow the opinions of his own court. An application to vacate
Judge Cameron's stays was filed in the Supreme Court with Mr.
Justice Black-the Justice designated for many years to review mat-
ters from the Fifth Circuit. The Attorney General of the State of
Mississippi filed an opposition. The Solicitor General of the United
States received a request from the Clerk of the Court that the Depart-
ment of Justice file a memorandum setting forth our views on the
power of Judge Cameron to issue the stays he did, and on the power
of Mr. Justice Black, as a single Justice, to set them aside.
On August 31, in accordance with the request from the Court,
we filed our memorandum. This was the first time that the executive
branch of the Government had anything to do with the proceedings.
The memorandum gave our legal opinion that Judge Cameron's stays
were unauthorized and that Mr. Justice Black had full power, acting
alone, to set them aside. On September 10, Mr. Justice Black acted.
He issued an order setting aside the stays issued by Judge Cameron
and enjoining the respondents from interfering with compliance with
the orders of the Court of Appeals. Although he did not have to do
so, Justice Black noted in his memorandum that he had in fact con-
sulted with each other member of the Court, and that his .action had
their unanimous concurrence.
This order of the Court marked the effective end of the litigation
in terms of Meredith's right to enter the University of Mississippi this
fall. The precise issue before Justice Black was whether the orders
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of the court should become effective before the September term of the
University began, or whether they should be stayed, as Judge Cameron
alone had thought, until the Supreme Court could act on a petition
for certiorari after its October Term started. The only question pre-
sented at any time during the litigation was whether the University
of Mississippi was a segregated institution, and whether Meredith
was denied admission to it because he was a Negro. Both were ques-
tions of fact which the Court would not ordinarily review.
During the next 20 days the federal government made every effort
to accomplish this. The Attorney General and finally the President
held numerous conversations with the officials of Mississippi and their
lawyers in continuing efforts to bring about peaceful compliance with
the courts' orders.
On September 13, three days after the Supreme Court's order,
Governor Barnett - himself a prominent lawyer - proclaimed his
defiance of federal law. In a televised speech he invoked the doctrine
of interposition, calling upon all officials of the State to refuse to
submit to whatever obligations were placed upon them by federal court
orders as a result of the Meredith case. As a result, in keeping with
the twin obligations to protect the integrity of the orders of the courts,
but to do so under the law and without force if possible, the Depart-
ment of Justice for the first time entered the litigation as a friend
of the court to assist it in making its order effective.
On September 20, the regular registration day for transfer stud-
ents, Mr. Meredith, accompanied by a token and symbolic number of
officers of the court, went to Oxford, Mississippi, to register in the
University under the court order. He was personally rejected by the
Governor, who had been designated by the Board of Trustees of the
University to act on behalf of the University.
We immediately instituted civil contempt proceedings against the
University officials and the Board of Trustees in the District Court
and then in the Court of Appeals. These were successful in accomplish-
ing their purpose, which was to make clear to the University that it
had an inescapable obligation that could not be delegated to political
officials, to comply with the orders of the court. The Board of Trustees
of the University pledged in open court that they would accept and
keep Meredith as a student.
The next day Meredith, again accompanied by a small number of
federal officials, went to Jackson, Mississippi, in accordance with the
specific direction of the court, to register as a student. The Registrar
was physically prevented from making himself available to perform
this ministerial function. Again Meredith was personally confronted by
Governor Barnett and refused permission to attend the University.
Another effort was made the next day to attend classes in Oxford.
A symbolic show of force was attempted; Chief Marshal McShane
tried to push his way through state police officers onto the University
grounds. This was done to make plain to the state officials the inevit-
able consequences of their course of action. Meredith and the federal
officials were turned away by physical force by state police under
the personal direction of Lt. Governor Johnson.
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On the following day, an arrangement for a larger show of force,
ending in acceptance by the State of the court orders, was called off
at the last minute because of the danger of extreme violence.
We instituted civil contempt proceedings against the Governor and
the Lt. Governor. On September 28, the Court of Appeals gave the
Governor, at the suggestion of the Department of justice, until the
morning of October 2 to cease his interference with compliance with
the orders of the courts.
Following that, after calling off one arrangement agreed to on
Saturday, Governor Barnett agreed to an arrangement for Sunday,
September 30, which was in fact carried out, to have Mr. Meredith
taken to the University of Mississippi by a large number of deputy
marshals. This arrangement was made because the alternative to both
the State and the federal government was the likelihood of an armed
clash of great magnitude on Monday, the following day - October 1.
The federal government was not completely successful in avoiding
violence in this episode. But it did finally avoid what seemed for a
time inescapable - a direct confrontation of force by federal troops
against the people and government of the State of Mississippi.
